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TALLAHASSEE, Fla. /Florida Newswire/ -– Governor Charlie Crist today met with Florida REALTORS® to discuss Florida’s housing market. Governor Crist encouraged first-time home buyers to take advantage of the tax credit made available through the federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The $8,000 tax credit applies to primary residences as long as they are purchased before December 1, 2009.“Even though today is Tax Day, first-time Florida home buyers can still claim the tax savings on their 2008 tax return – even if the closing is after today – by requesting an extension or filing an amended return,” Governor Crist said. “Or they can also claim it on 2009 tax return, which will be filed next year. Either way, I encourage Floridians and newcomers to Florida to take advantage of this tax break and bargain prices on Florida real estate.”Governor Crist also discussed his continued commitment to reduce the tax burden on Florida homeowners and business property owners. He has proposes a set of property-tax reforms that builds upon previous legislation resulting in the largest property tax cut in state history.The National Association of REALTORS estimates that the impact of the federal economic stimulus package and lower interest rates will result in approximately 900,000 additional home sales in 2009 compared to conditions before the stimulus package. According to Freddie Mac, interest rates for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage averaged 4.87 percent for the week of April 9, 2009, down significantly from the average rate of 5.97 percent in March 2008.According to the Florida Association of REALTORS, Florida’s existing home sales rose in February, making it the sixth consecutive month with an increase in sales activity. Existing home sales rose 20 percent in February 2009 compared to the number of homes sold in February 2008. Statewide, existing condo sales increased 25 percent over the total units sold in January.About the First-Time Florida Home Buyer Tax CreditFor homes purchased before December 1, 2009, the credit does not have to be paid back unless the home ceases to be the taxpayer’s main residence within a three-year period following the purchase. First-time homebuyers who purchase a home in 2009 can claim the credit on either a 2008 tax return, which are due today, or on a 2009 tax return, due April 15, 2010. If the purchase occurs after April 15, 2009, home buyers can still receive the credit on a 2008 tax return by requesting an extension of time to file or by filing an amended return.Information about the tax credit for first-time home buyers can be found at www.FlaRecovery.com in the “Tax Relief” section. For more information about Florida’s use of the federal recovery dollars made available through the federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, please visit www.FlaRecovery.comJason Donn - Real Estate Open Networkers
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Well, this morning I woke up, the sun was shining, the birds were chirping, school bells were ringing and I had a flash of genius. That’s right, a simple, non threatening, low key, under whelming FLASH of genius. Surprised? Well, so was I. I want to be Judge Judy and Gordon Ramsey’s love child. Ok, so….maybe you’re laughing out loud at this moment but, hear me out, I am going somewhere with this. I want Judge Judy’s tenacity, unwavering truth seeking and inability to be duped. I want Gordon Ramsey’s commitment to excellence to both himself and those around him as well as, his eye for talent and his ability to speak what is truly on his mind and people get it. I also want some traits that they both share, which are, a flare for the dramatic (which I may have been born with but, never really tapped into), an ability to command an audience and, creating success from the ground up. Truth is, I think Judge Judy and Gordon Ramsey’s love child would make a really strong REO Agent. All of the characteristics I listed above are what you need to be in this business and, if I could develop them to the level of Judge Judy and Gordon Ramsey….well, I would be unstoppable. Of course, those skills I listed aren’t the only ones you will need but, it’s a great place to start. So for all of you looking to get your first REO then, think about what I have written today and ask yourself, is what you are doing now succeeding? Have you gotten your first REO? The one attribute I admire the most, of the many very highly successful people have, is adaptation. Learning to change and adapt is how you stay alive, grow and eventually reach your pinnacle. It’s a cosmic fact that the only constant in this universe is that constant isn’t possible. Whoa….that was deep....maybe too deep for my REO blog…lol My point is, if what you’re doing isn’t working, why are you still doing it? Are you mad? I am a true believer in engineering your success and, yes…before Edison finally engineered the proper filament to use for the light bulb, it is said he had thousands of trials and error….thousands but, what made a difference for him is that he learned something new about each and every failure that, in my opinion is what separates perseverance and madness.
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I am proud to announce that REOPro’s Google page rank is now up to 2. If you don’t know why that is important, let me explain. A Google page rank is a number that represent just how important your page is on the web. The more important you are, the more likely you will appear at the top of searches using keywords that describe your page. In other words, if someone does a Google search for “REOPro”, the more likely our page will appear at the top of the results that come up with a higher page rank. In fact, right now, we are number 8 out of 84,200 results with a current page rank of 2…that’s great! Now this is true with all our keywords, granted, none of them are as high as REOPro but, the higher our page rank, the more likely all those other keywords will start bubbling to the top. Keep in mind, those of you who blog regularly……the more appearances on the main page, the more likely keywords in your blogs will be ranked as well. For example, if you search “Jesse Gonzalez” you will get 2,800,000.00 results of which, I am in the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th slots, putting me in 4 of the top 10. If we change the keyword just a bit and type “Jesse Gonzalez REO” then I appear in the top 9 spots out of 163,000 results, not bad. The best part is, almost all of those 9 spots are my blogs. Do you get the idea? So, what can you do to help you improve your page rank as well as help out REOPro’s page rank? Linking is one of the most important things you can do to raise your page rank. Google calculates that if your page is important enough to have someone link to it, then that means something. So, if you haven’t put our REOPro badge on your main page of your website, you need to do so. Links and back links to industry related sites are the key to obtaining a high Page Rank. Thanks again all and good luck. I look forward to seeing those link request coming in.
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Generation Y: Bullish on U.S. Housing Market

First major national housing survey during current downturn reveals surprising resultsNEWPORT BEACH, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The first major survey into Generation Y’s perception of the U.S. housing crisis reveals a surprisingly strong sense of optimism about the future despite cautious near-term sentiment.While the housing industry is readying for this wave of future homeowners (approximately 80 million strong), there is little data on what this influential buying group actually wants in their next home or how the current downturn has affected their future plans.According to the national survey conducted by The Concord Group:50% say they are likely to purchase a home within the next three years50% say tax credits or lower interest rates would motivate them to purchase a residence sooner70% believe home prices will be higher or at today’s levels in two years62% say wealth creation is a very big advantage of real estate ownershipAlthough economic conditions factor strongly in their decision-making process, survey respondents say that lower home prices and/or a raise at work would be the top motivations for buying a home sooner than planned."Generation Y is going to have more impact on the national housing market than any group since the early Baby Boomers. We wanted to better understand their preferences and expectations especially as they will have such an impact on our future,” said Emma Tyaransen, Principal of The Concord Group, a national real estate advisory firm.The majority of respondents to The Concord Group’s survey say they are:Willing to pay a premium to live closer to their jobSeeking out a larger space for their next residenceInterested in living near alternative modes of transportationLikely to put down less than 20% on their next residential purchasePlanning to eventually abandon the cities for a life in the suburbs“What’s so interesting about this data is that it supports our prediction that transit-oriented development will command a premium in the near future. It also proves that suburban development will continue to play an important role in the housing market that emerges from the downturn,” said Tyaransen.The Concord Group is a premiere national real estate advisory firm with offices in Newport Beach, CA; San Francisco, CA; Portland, OR and Boston, MA. The Concord Group provides developers, investors and public planning agencies with vital analytical input throughout all phases of real estate financing, development and operations. www.theconcordgroup.comJason DonnAllStar Realty954-892-6244
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Shadow Supply of Foreclosures

BY KATHLEEN DOLER FOR INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY Posted 3/24/2009 Even as a few rays of hope peek out for housing, a dark cloud of unlisted and unsold foreclosed homes threatens to further delay a recovery and undermine lenders' financials. The government is riding in with new programs almost every week, including Monday, that may rescue lenders. But they also cause paralysis in the short term. Lenders are holding "between 600,000 and 700,000 residential properties that are not on the multiple listing service (MLS) ," said Rick Sharga, senior vice president at RealtyTrac, a foreclosure listing firm in Irvine, Calif. This shadow supply isn't counted as part of the housing inventory. There were 3.8 million existing homes on the market in February, equal to 9.7 months' worth at the current sales pace. Add in the shadow supply and selling all the available homes will take even longer, and that suggests prices have even further to fall. There has been some good news on the home front. February existing-home sales rose 5.1%, the best monthly gain in years. Housing starts shot up 22.2% from a record low. Low mortgage rates and falling prices have made homes more affordable — though that doesn't help if you can't get a loan or you've lost your job. Meanwhile, foreclosure activity has been artificially suppressed. Mortgage delinquency rates have continued to soar in the last several months even as the new foreclosure rate has held steady. That's due to government moratoriums or voluntary lender halts. But most experts say eventually most of those homes will be foreclosed. Lenders also may be understating the impact foreclosures will have on their balance sheets. And the shadow is likely to grow as more homeowners default. Window Dressing? Specialists who handle loan modifications for borrowers say that despite a flurry of new programs, few mortgages are being reworked. "Lenders aren't doing anything," said Jim Richman, president and founder of Richman & Associates, a real estate and debt restructuring firm in Glendale, Calif. "They're waiting to see if the government will bail them out." "Everybody is stalled 100%; the lenders aren't doing anything" with modifications, said Moe Bedard, president of Loan Safe Solutions, a Corona, Calif.-based firm that does mortgage auditing for attorneys. Richman is a former banker and former Housing and Urban Development commissioner. He also believes lenders "are illegally operating under current federal rules," by not writing down their foreclosures adequately. "Lenders are doing everything they can to stay in business, but it's against all the rules," said Richman. "(Regulators) are afraid to enforce the rules because if they do the banks will fail, and the feds will have to bail them out." Sharga says he's spoken "directly with foreclosure attorneys in several states (including Texas, Michigan and California) to find out if any of their firms were reappraising properties" during the foreclosure process for their clients. "None did formal appraisals," he said. Sharga says lenders have taken huge write-downs. But if they have not reappraised their foreclosures, are the write-downs adequate? "What the banks can buy with time (holding foreclosures and not listing them for sale) is the tooth fairy," said Thomas Barrack Jr., founder, chairman and CEO of Colony Capital, a Los Angeles-based private equity firm specializing in real estate. "The government has shown that if you wait long enough, it will come out with a new program to modify the obligations of the bank and borrower. Pixie dust comes every week." The Treasury on Monday laid out its plan to partner with private funds to buy up to $1 trillion in so-called "toxic assets." It's as-yet unclear if these purchases will include actual foreclosed properties — these programs tend to morph as they get rolled out. "Why take a loss today if there's any chance that loss could be less (due to changes in government programs)?" said Terry McEvoy, a banking analyst with Oppenheimer & Co. in New York. Some shadow inventory may not be listed publicly because some lenders sell foreclosures via in-house divisions, says Bedard. Or, lenders may be selling the defaulted paper to investors. But these gray market sales can't account for all unlisted foreclosed properties. And the stalling is getting worse. "What we're seeing is slowdowns in the processing of properties throughout the foreclosure cycle . . . it's taking longer to file (default) notices, taking longer to actually foreclose and taking longer to get the properties on the market," said Sharga. "The lenders ease their way into the losses," said Jeff Davis, senior vice president and director of research at Howe Barnes Hoefer & Arnett Inc., Chicago. "If the economy would pick up, a lot of the issues wouldn't be as problematic. But that's not happening and these issues are just compounding." If banks dump their properties at once, it could cause dramatic price erosion in already hard-hit areas. Home prices, which have fallen 30% or more in some areas, still have more to go, many experts say. In some areas they need to drop "another 30% to get down to 1998 normalized levels," Barrack says. Lenders have argued before Capitol Hill to relax or suspend mark-to-market rules for valuing mortgage-backed securities. Lawmakers, in turn, have leaned heavily on the private-sector Financial Accounting Standards Board to make changes. FASB has signaled it'll modify the rule in cases where markets are illiquid. It met Tuesday to discuss the issue. Barrack, who opposes changing the mark-to-market rules, said: "When real estate and securities were booming, the lenders were booking unbelievable earnings. Now the market is going the other way. "They can't have it both ways," Barrack said. Other analysts disagree. "When you mark to the market and there is no market, you're recognizing an economic loss and a loss of liquidity," instead of an actual loss, said Davis. But he said if the underlying assets —the homes — "are collapsing in value, then there's a problem."
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Ahh the media!!

http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/26/real_estate/California_comeback/index.htm?postversion=2009040311I find it incredible that the media continues to have NO IDEA what is actually happening in the real estate market. The same media that help deepen the chasm of the market fall with headlines telling everyone the sky was falling at first sign of a market slow down two years ago. Now they want to overlook that vast majority of economists who predict we are going to be mired in this until mid 2011. California? California has just begun to feel the pain that’s coming. We will now see areas previously un-effected have their own foreclosure challenges. Check the amount of NOD's or the number of short sales in the MLS in affluent South Orange County for instance. I am glad the major newspapers and publications are no longer banging the drum for the death march but now as then, a little more truth in message seems to be in order.
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NCTimes.com Californian.comLast modified Friday, April 3, 2009 8:42 PM PDTHOUSING: Now federal loans are sinking, tooBy ZACH FOX - North County TimesOnce considered among the safest loans available, government-insured mortgages issued last year have performed worse than the subprime loans that kicked off the collapse of the nation's housing market, according to data from a research firm.So far, government bailouts have put up to $2.9 trillion of taxpayer money at risk, according to the government official in charge of overseeing all bailouts.A huge level of defaults on loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration, which analysts called "stunning," raise the specter of further market turmoil and more taxpayer funds sent toward fixing the mortgage crisis."Frankly, I wouldn't be surprised if you called me up in a year from now and asked, 'What do you think about the FHA bailout?' " said Norm Miller, a professor at University of San Diego's Burnham-Moores Center for Real Estate.First American CoreLogic, a prominent mortgage data firm, reported this week that 20.7 percent of all FHA loans issued in 2008 were at least 60 days late by 10 months after the origination date. By the same metric, 14.1 percent of subprime loans issued in 2007 were 60 days delinquent.The main problem with the delinquent FHA loans was low down-payment requirements, said Sam Khater, senior economist for First American CoreLogic.While most mortgages issued by private banks now require at least 10 percent down payments, FHA loans allow borrowers to buy a home who put up just 3.5 percent of the cost.In San Diego County, prices fell more than 2 percent each month from August through January, according to Standard & Poor's Case-Shiller Home Price Index. In Riverside County, prices have tumbled even more.That means within two months of purchasing an FHA-insured home, the borrower probably owed more than the value of the home. And as layoffs mount, a loss of employment typically leaves the borrower in foreclosure or short sale ---- where the borrower resells and the lender settles for less than the amount of the loan."When you put out a (low down payment) product in the context of very high depreciation, it's going to happen," Khater said about the high delinquency numbers.By definition, FHA loans carry little equity. But the risk of failure was increased by the implementation of "down payment assistance" programs implemented by home builders, said Ramsey Su, a San Diego housing analyst.Those programs often covered the rest of the down payment and sometimes even covered the closing costs, meaning a homebuyer could borrow more than the value of the home and pay no money whatsoever up front.The government has since discontinued the programs.But before they did, FHA became the resource for riskier buyers, Su said."FHA became the subprime lender after the subprime market died," he said.As mortgage financing dried up over the past year, the Federal Housing Administration has experienced a renaissance, going from rare to prevalent among new loans. FHA caters to low-income borrowers who have little money to put down, but the loans typically carried stringent qualification requirements such as low debt-to-income ratios.The FHA insures more than 4.8 million loans, according to the department.Locally, Bank of America has seen FHA loans go from virtually nonexistent to 35 percent to 40 percent of the overall business, said Jim Loney, a sales manager at the lender's Carlsbad office.FHA loans were especially rare in San Diego County because the products used to be capped at $362,790. But in 2007, Congress agreed to raise the limit in high-cost areas, upping the maximum loan in San Diego County to $697,500."I didn't do an FHA loan for nine years," said Dave Hopkins, a mortgage broker in Encinitas. Now, he estimates the products constitute 10 percent of his business.
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Pre-Approved Shortsales Breaking Out?

Well, I've bloged about this several months ago. Pre-Approved Short Sales!! I closed my first one 2wks ago and from list to close total time was 40 days. Yes 40 days, I recieved a list price 96 hours after submitting my BPO, which was priced 10K below my BPO value. I got multiple offers within he first7 days on the market and the property sold for 5K more than list price (Closer to my BPO value). My local board rules require us market any short sale as such, which in the past and sometimes hinders offers beacuse all of us know that there is nothing short about a traditional shortsale.This did not increase the time on the Market, as we advertised it as a HomeTeleos Pre-Approved Short Sale. This program has officially launched and you may see it in a City or County near you. Its true when you see HomeTeloes Pre-Approved short sale, then really are short sales. www.hometeleos.com I'd love the hear from anyone else if they are doing anything similar or have heard of any similar programs launching. I think it will be a matter of time before others follow if they have not already done so.
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I am a Realtor in North Idaho. Coeur d' Alene, ID to be exact. I have been in the business for 8 years. Two years ago I saw that the market was shifting downward. Our foreclosure rates were on the rise and I saw an opportunity in a field that I had always wanted to pursue. I had done three bank owned deals in my career. They were all with local mom and pop banks. How did I break into the REO's?Well for one, I refused to accept the mantra that it is a closed field. I followed FC notices in our paper and followed homes that interested me all the way through the sale. When no one bid at the auction, I googled XYZ bank REO department. I called and stayed on hold forever. I was always polite. When I got through to the right person, I would say "Hi I am an agent that works in the area that your bank just took a home back in. How would I go about getting on the list to be an approved Realtor to help sell this asset for you? Most times they would say "we are not interested". This actually rarely worked but I kept at it. One day I was walking in my neighborhood and I noticed a vacant house with dead grass (the REO calling card!) The neighbor was super helpful and told me she heard a bank out of TX owned it now. I googled this bank and got the right number to call them. I gave the lady my spill and she said "I was just about to assign that one; it is right in front of me. What is your fax number and I'll send you over the agreement!" I don’t know if cloud 9 would be high enough for how high I was floating!I may have been on cloud 9 but I was clueless too! I knew how to sell homes but the REO side was new to me. I never let my seller know how clueless I was. Anytime something came up that I was unsure about I got online and googled till I figured it out. I registered on the various sites to upload the offers and forms, again learning as I went. I paid invoices with no idea of how I was going to get paid back. I was able to get this little home sold for a good price and the asset manager was happy. Not a week later the same bank sent me two more REO listings!From there, I could see that I was on to a good thing and that this is something I needed to pursue all out. I began buying courses, googling, reading blogs, and just getting information anyway I could. One of my courses gave me a list of banks to register with. I built a resume and gathered the necessary forms. I spent one week registering with every single bank on the list. I paid for memberships to several REO platforms so asset managers could find me. I continued following foreclosures in the paper all the way through the sell. I continued calling those banks. My business grew and grew.To this day I continue doing all of the above. I never sit still or take my inventory for granted. I would say that I am one of the smaller fish in this huge pond of REO brokers. I currently have 12 REO's in some stage of the process. Just yesterday I closed two and one more is signing today. I have been able to build a list of investors that want these properties so I find myself doing both sides of about 25% of my properties. I consult with them throughout the remodel and then help them sell them if they are flip deals.I learned early on that you have to build systems to maintain the influx of properties. My scanner and Blackberry are my new best friends! People drive me crazy when they say "ohh, you are so lucky to have all these deals in a dead market." My broker once told me the harder you work the luckier you are. Now that I can believe. If you want to get started in REO's work at it, envision it, be determined, and stick to a plan. I believe this REO boom will be around for awhile. Grasp the opportunity and go for it!P.S. I am envisioning myself working with Bank of America and Wells Fargo! I'm not sure how that is going to come about but I know it will! Any tips?The Holy Grail in my business would be to get in with Bank of America or Wells Fargo. If anyone has any tips there, that would be great.
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CMBS Outlook Finds Conditions Are Bad and Getting Worse for Office, Retail and Hotel SectorsDeteriorating CMBS Loan Performance Indicates Worst May Not Be OverArticleBy Mark HeschmeyerApril 8, 2009Judging from the latest analysis coming out on the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market, the worst may be yet to come for commercial real estate.Recent reports issued by Deutsche Bank, DBRS and Fitch Ratings find that commercial real estate fundamentals have dramatically weakened across most major property segments and markets, with some starting to reach the depressed levels of the last major recession in the early 1990s.And as conditions worsen, borrowers and workout specialist may have fewer and fewer options, the reports warn, which could further depress the industry.Richard Parkus, head of CMBS Research at Deutsche Bank, projected in his firm's commercial real estate outlook last month that property prices are expected to decline 35% to 45% (or more) overall during this recession. That would exceed the sale price declines seen in the early 1990s. Parkus added that declines in rental and vacancy rates may also approach levels of the early 1990s.CMBS collateral performance are currently deteriorating at a historically fast pace and Parkus predicted the total delinquency rate could likely to exceed 3.5% by year-end. That is one of the highest estimates that have been projected by CMBS analysts. Worse still, Parkus added, it could go as high as 6% by 2010. The peak delinquency rates in early 1990s were 6% to 7%.CRE at a PrecipiceBy far the greatest risk facing CMBS loans right now is maturity default/extension risk, not term default risk, Parkus of Deutsch Bank said.A large percentage of CMBS loans made in 2005-2008 may not qualify for refinancing without substantial equity injections due to much tighter underwriting standards, massive price declines and declining cash flow.Multifamily loan performance has been deteriorating at a dramatic pace, Parkus said, with Midwestern "rust-belt" states plus Florida, Georgia and Texas among the worst performing markets. Interestingly, California and Arizona, ground zero for residential mortgage problems, continue to experience very low multifamily delinquencies.Parkus also noted that the deterioration of office properties values are beginning to accelerate due to job cuts. "We expect office to be one of the hardest hit property segments," Parkus said.Parkus noted what happened with 1540 Broadway in New York. Macklowe Properties purchased the office building in Time Square two years ago from Equity Office Properties for $1,080 per square foot.Last month, CBRE Richard Ellis Investors purchased the building for $403 per square foot -- an almost 63% price decline in two years.Retail CMBS Loss Severities To ClimbMeanwhile, Fitch Ratings put out a particularly bleak outlook for retail loan performance, projecting that loss severities on retail loans are likely to trend upward for the next several years as defaults on retail loans increase.Exacerbated by declining consumer spending and the shrinking U.S. economy, retail vacancies will likely increase to new highs as bankruptcies, store closings and retail consolidation continues, the bond rating agency said.Consumer spending has declined 4.3% as of year-end 2008. That contrasts with the Internet-bubble reduced recession of 2002 and 2003 when consumer spending remained positive.Retail delinquencies account for $1.7 billion of the $6.2 billion total delinquencies in the Fitch Loan Delinquency Index. The Loan Delinquency Index across all property types is 1.28%; with 1.17% of all retail loans within the index currently delinquent. Fitch expects defaults in the retail sector to contribute a greater percentage of the index into 2010.Specifically, Fitch said it expects losses on retail loans may increase as much as 34% to 60% from the 5-year cumulative average of 44% for current defaults."Increased vacancies in the retail sector will lead to longer resolution times as it will take longer to re-tenant space which will ultimately result in higher losses," said Mary MacNeill, managing director of Fitch Ratings.Hotel CMBS Loan Performance Deteriorating RapidlyIn a report issued on hotel loans held in commercial mortgage-backed securities by DBRS, the bond rating agency noted that, in a declining economy, commercial real estate investors are seeking long-term leases, low tenant rollover, low expense ratios and the ability to pass along increasing operating expense to tenants. Unfortunately, hotel properties offer none of these features."News coming out of the hotel market is, quite simply, not good. Well, bad actually. No, make that terrifying," the bond rating agency said. "Predicting hotel performance over the next 12 to 18 months is like juggling chainsaws while riding a unicycle."Most informed market participants seem to be gathering consensus around a high single-digit percentage decrease for revenue per available room (RevPAR). Given the apparent inability for most individuals to grasp just how bad the economy is and how bad it will get, it would not be surprising to see decline in RevPAR by well more than 10% in 2009, DBRS said.Options NarrowingAs CMBS loan delinquencies climb, Parkus of Deutsch Bank said, the options available for borrowers will likely start to narrow.As CMBS special servicers are appraised out of their controlling class positions over the next two years, they may have less incentive to extend maturing loan, Parkus said. In addition, senior bondholders are becoming much more activist against extensions."We expect this conflict to intensify significantly over time, bringing the threat of legal action against special servicers that practice widespread extensions," Parkus said.Fitch Ratings also said special servicers may need to explore several different options to maximize recoveries. For example, with single-tenant retail, spaces can be marketed to non-traditional entertainment tenants. Conversely, they can also be subdivided in order to attract smaller tenants. Large vacant mall locations, such as those left vacant by Steve & Barry's or Macys, typically find more interest by subdividing the space or even selling the space back to the mall operator for redevelopment.Barring such options, special servicers could be more likely to foreclose on properties as borrowers become unable to fund operating shortfalls due to the loss of tenants, Fitch Ratings said.
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In an effort to control mosquitos that carry the West Nile Virus in foreclosed homes that have pools with stagnant water (green pools) the Las Vegas Nevada Health District's "Mosquito Control Program" have introduced Gambusia Affinis. It is a minnow like fish that lists mosquito larvae as it's favorite food. The fish were initially introduced to control mosquito population in wetland areas. With the increased amount of foreclosures with pools containing "green pools" they have become the health district's allies to prevent the West Nile Virus. Real estate agents or neighbors are asked to contact the health district when they encounter a "green pool". The health district will show up with fish in tow and get to work. They will only add fish to pools when the pumps are off. The purchaser is asked to call the health district to relocate the fish to a new home and another buffet of mosquito larvae.
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The REO (real estate owned) foreclosed home market is hot right now in the Prescott area with many homes priced under an already depressed market price.When banks price REOs under the market price, multiple offers are often the response. This means buyers can be up against stiff competition for that bank-owned home.It’s not unusual for some bargain-priced REO homes in the Prescott area to receive 3 or 5 offers. Sometimes the bank will throw out all but two offers and then ask the selected buyers to resubmit what is called “Highest and Final” offer. Sometimes the bank simply accepts the best offer at inception, or they can start over. Fun isn’t it?If you’re wondering how you can make your offer rise above all the rest and be the winning offer, here are the top 10 tips to win the REO multiple offer game with right packaging, price, terms and conditions:1. Know What the Bank Note Is For and What they PaidAsk your foreclosure buyer’s agent to find out the bank’s purchase price on the Trustee’s Deed. Compare that price to the price the bank is asking. Then, look at the amount of loans that were once secured to the property. Usually, the amount the bank will accept is somewhere between the original mortgage balance(s) and the foreclosure sale price. BUT, don’t put TOO much emphasis on these numbers when they are low. It a property is worth $300,000 and the bank is holding a note for only $100,000, they are not going to take $100k for it. They not not against making a profit on the rare occasion when they are not upside down. They’ll likely hold out until a reasonable offer appears.2. Know the Comparable Sales DataMake sure you know what properties have been selling for in the immediate area, both REO and traditional sales. The bank already got this data when they received their Broker Price Opinion (BPO) to determine the listing price and might have another BPO once the offers were reviewed. If the comparable sales for REOs has been $120/sqft in the neighborhood and you are offering $90/sqft, you can expect a counter at best and most likely will never hear back from the bank.3. Do an Analysis of the Listing Agent’s REO Pricing RecordMost REO agents focus as listing agents for REOs, and often they do not list any other type of property. Since REO agents deal in volume, they typically apply the same pricing principles to all their REO listings. Have your foreclosure buyer’s agent pull the history of the listing agent’s listings to determine the list-price to sales-price ratio. If most of those listings are selling for, say, 5% under list price, then you will have some guidance as to how much you need to offer.4. Know your Competition - Ask About the Number of OffersIf there are no offers on the REO home, you can probably offer less than list price and get your offer accepted. However, if there are more than two offers, you may need to offer above the asking price. If there are 10 offers, bear in mind that some of those offers might be all cash. Banks like all cash offers. If you are obtaining financing, then you may need to increase the price on your offer to be considered.5. Prepare an Offer Summary as a Cover SheetThis is aimed at simplifying the process for the Asset Manager, who, will more often than not, have 400 - 500 properties under management and often in multiple states with vastly different real estate contracts. This cover sheet will have the basics only (Price, Terms, Concessions, Closing dates, etc.).See a sample cover sheet. If you are an agent and want one emailed to you in Word format, just contact me.6. Choose a Closing Date Before the End of the MonthTry to have close of escrow on or before the 25th of the month. Banks are assessed their handling charges on the first and if they have not received the check before the end of the month then there is an additional charge for them.7. Submit Your Loan Status Report or Proof of Funds with your OfferIt goes without saying that you do not want to submit an offer without showing the REO manager that you have the means to purchase the home. If you are getting a loan, then it’s of paramount importance to submit the Loan Status Report (LSR) with your offer. If you are paying cash, you need to show proof of funds. Often buyers submit copies of money market account or bank statements (with the account numbers obscured) to show that they are capable of completing the purchase.8. Give Enough Time for the Bank to RespondUnlike homeowners who are typically working on one transaction at a time and can respond within 24 or 48 hours, REO asset managers usually hundreds of homes they are trying to dispose of. And since many of these are getting multiple offers, the amount of workload can be be overwhelming. This is why we suggest allowing 7 - 10 days as the response time on offers. Sometimes responses will come much quicker, but other times even longer. Manage your own expectations for response as well and make sure your agent is following up.Don’t take it personally when you don’t hear back…it’s not personal, it’s business!9. Don’t Try to Choose your own Title CompanyChoosing the escrow company who will help close the transaction is normally the buyer’s decision, but when buying a bank-owned home, buyers need to be flexible. One of the items that your buyer will need to be flexible about is that the bank will, more than likely, want to choose the title and escrow companies. This is due to the fact that they have significant amounts of title work done during the foreclosure process so they usually want to stay with that title company. Please be aware that many of the escrow and title companies that banks choose to use are not local, and that they are usually low bidders who are overwhelmed by transactions as well. They will have traveling notary services or local options for document signing, but don’t expect the same service you get from your favorite escrow officer. If you are an agent, take an active role in trying to help the title company get the contacts they need locally, like the HOA information, etc.10. Shorten the Inspection Period and Don’t Ask for Repairs at the Offer StageIf other buyers are asking for 15 days to conduct inspections, and you ask for 10, you will be deemed the more serious buyer. Banks, just like traditional sellers, don’t like the “Free Look” that the Arizona contract offers buyers during the inspection period. If your agent can’t make everything happen within 10 days, (home inspection, termite inspection, special inspections) ask why not. Sometimes banks will pay for repairs, but typically will not agree to do so at the offer stage. If there are serious problems are found during a home inspection, try to renegotiate after your offer has been accepted. Banks are much more likely to offer concessions once your offer is in the hopper, especially if the repairs are required as a loan condition.Bonus Tip: Offer to Split Transfer Fees if You Ask for Any Concessions at AllAs a rule, banks do not like to pay transfer fees, but if the buyer offers to split those fees, the bank will feel more amenable to accepting the offer. We suggest offering 50-50 splits on all transfer fees and do not ask for further concessions like seller paying buyer’s escrow costs, etc.Keep all of these tips in mind when you are making offers and you will experience far less frustration and and much more success when trying to buy bank-owned properties in the Prescott area.Bonus Tip #2: Write your contract in English and not legalese.Forget what the last CE instructor taught you at your renewal hours, and go back to writing the contract in plain English.Want to see an example of how not to write a contract?
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I have many clients who call me looking for deals on short sales and foreclosed homes in the Prescott Arizona area market including Precott Valley, Chino Valley and Dewey-Humboldt. Many think that short sales are better deals than foreclosures, but his is rarely the case.What the difference?The short sale process has many moving parts that must be aligned in order for the sale to close. First of all, the lenders have to agree to a short sale, but sometimes banks won’t agree to a short sale without an offer. This means that the home has been listing for a price that the bank hasn’t agreed to, and once the offer comes in, the bank will assign a loss mitigator to review the process. This could take several months and most likely will involve a counter offer by the bank close to the loan amount…regardless of whether or not the loan has any bearing on market value. Then the games begin.When you buy a foreclosure in the Prescott area, the process is much more straightforward and the prices are set by the bank and not a by the homeowner and REALTOR, who have nothing to lose by listing it below market value. In fact, it stimulates demand and clients for the listing agent and the homeowner thinks there is progress because people are looking at their home and making offers.That’s not to say that all short sales are not good buys. The key to success is being prepared and having a full understanding of the process.For links to more information, see my Prescott AZ Area Foreclosures Blog
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Obama's Busted Bank Bailout

Obama’s Busted Bank BailoutBy Jack RasmusGlobal Research, April 1, 2009Z Magazine, April 2009Author’s Note:Parts of the following article were published in the April issue of ‘Z’ Magazine. It was written in February, after the US Treasury Secretary, Geithner, announced his initial draft bailout program. That initial program was met with widespread rejection by bankers, investors, and the business press. It was revised significantly by Geithner on March 23. What follows below is an expanded version of the article written by the author that appears in the April issue of ‘Z’. The expanded integrates Geithner’s revised March 23 PPIP proposals into the analysis of the Obama Administration’s shifting bank bailout strategy.This revised article notes the strategic significance of the Geithner March 23 changes for bailing out the banks, how those changes represent a major shift in strategy, and the emerging longer term consequences of the strategy shift).In February 2009, economic data across the board revealed an accelerating decline of the U.S. economy, both in its financial and non-financial elements:Gross domestic product (GDP) data for the U.S. economy for the fourth quarter 2008 was fundamentally revised downward, showing the US economy had contracted by more than 6.2%. The economy’s contraction for the first three months of 2009 will almost certainly show an even faster decline.Unemployment levels from November 2008 through February 2009 show an official rise in joblessness of nearly two million, according to official US government data. When properly adjusted, however, to include the six million new underemployed since the recession began plus discouraged and other workers not recorded in the official data, the actual U.S. unemployment has risen by at minimum three million since last November. Properly calculated, there are now more than thirteen million unemployed in the U.S. By year-end 2009 the unemployed will very likely exceed twenty million.Meanwhile, in January-February 2009 the balance sheets of banking and finance giants like Citigroup, Bank of America, AIG, Fannie Mae, and more than 250 regional banks now on the FDIC’s official danger list, continued to deteriorate badly. As the financial crisis continues to drag on unresolved, a rapidly growing number of once financially sound banks and financial institutions enter the growing ranks of ‘zombies’ (i.e. banks in name only and not performing the functions of banks in fact), while previous ‘zombies’ become virtual ‘cadavers’—many of the latter the top twenty largest banks in the U.S.In an attempt to check and stabilize the growing real and financial decline the new Obama administration proposed a four-part recovery program. The first part was the $787 billion fiscal stimulus bill passed in February. Of equal import to the fiscal stimulus package were three proposals to try to stabilize the financial system. These include the so-called ‘PPIF’ (Public-Private Investment Fund), the ‘TALF’ (Term Asset Backed Securities Lending Facility), and the ‘HASP’ (Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan).20 Million Jobless vs. $3 Trillion More for the BanksThe Obama $787 billion fiscal stimulus bill designed to resurrect the non-financial economy—now in virtual freefall—provides only $180 billion in total spending in 2009. Only $26 billion of that is allocated for job spending, according to the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. New jobs created in 2009, given that level of spending, will result in new job creation in the low hundred thousands at best, while simultaneously a minimum of 5-7 million new unemployed will be added to the jobless rolls in 2009. That’s less than a half-million new jobs compared to thirteen million new unemployed since the current Epic Recession began in late 2007.One thing is thus quite clear about the Obama fiscal stimulus plan: it is not a jobs creation program. It is not designed to create anything near the number of jobs that have been, are currently being, and will soon continue to be, lost.That key fact means the Obama stimulus package will not appreciably slow the collapse of consumer spending currently underway in the U.S. Job loss is at present the main driver of that collapse, along with other forces previously driving the decline of consumption—i.e. collapse of 401k and defined pension plans, freefall in stock and home owner equity, and sharp reductions in hours and earnings for the 90 million non-supervisory and production worker in the U.S. still with jobs.Constituting more than 70% of the US economy’s GDP, consumption has literally fallen off a cliff since October 2008. For the first time ever in data collecting history, consumption declined absolutely in the US the past year while the index for future consumer spending hit a postwar low at 35 out of 100. Business spending has fared no better. Business plans for capital expenditures show a decline of more than one third. At the same time, exports and world trade are contracting at the fastest rate in decades. There’s nothing left but aggressive government job creation action to stem the decline. But that action is not forthcoming in the recent stimulus bill.What the $787 billion represents is a stop-gap program to try to offset in part the magnitude of consumption collapse now underway. It is not a spending program to turn around the economy. Fully 38% of the stimulus is in the form of ‘Aid’ measures to offset jobs loss income with unemployment, food stamps, medical costs assistance, and various grants to state and local government. While worthy and necessary, it will not create any jobs. Another 38% of the stimulus is targeted for tax cuts. They will have no net effect on consumption. In fact, as many economists now note, the ‘multiplier effect’ of the tax cuts may actually be negative—that is the tax cuts will produce spending in an amount actually less than the value of the cuts themselves. That leaves only 24% remaining that represents spending on potential jobs projects. However, the vast majority of the jobs that might be created will be longer term, capital intensive, infrastructure jobs in alternative energy and public works.Both the magnitude of the direct spending on jobs creation ($26 billion in 2009 and less than $200 billion over the life of the package), as well as the composition of the jobs creation, are grossly deficient. Measured in terms of jobs, consumption, and general economic recovery, the Stimulus package represents “too little too late”. The likelihood is therefore high that a second stimulus package will be necessary within the next twelve months.In sharp contrast to the paltry spending in 2009 on jobs is the virtually unlimited, rapidly disbursed, and open-ended flow of funds now underway from U.S. government coffers into the banks and other financial and quasi-financial institutions. This uninhibited flow of funding includes a second $200 billion injection for Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac now that they ran out of the first $200 given them last August; another $60 billion for AIG, American Insurance Group, bringing its total to more than $200 billion to date; tens of billions more for Citigroup and Bank of America; hundreds of billions more for brokers of Commercial Paper and Money Market Funds, for foreign banks holding US securities, for credit card company giants like American Express, for Auto companies, plus a long list of others waiting in the wings. A grand total of at least $3 trillion thus far—and rising—disseminated to the banks, the broader financial sector, and beyond. That includes $1 trillion designated to the PPIF for buying of bank ‘bad assets’; another $1 trillion to ‘TALF’for resurrecting the ‘shadow banking’ system of hedge funds, private equity firms, and the like—i.e. the guys who gave us runaway speculation in securitized assets and the excess leveraging and debt run-up that underlies the origins of today’s continuing collapse of the financial system; and another $275 billion to ‘HASP’, which will be used primarily to subsidize mortgage lenders, servicers, and investors.What follows is an assessment and critique of these three elements of Obama’s bank-finance bailout, showing why the bank bailout is doomed to fail, why it won’t succeed in stabilizing the financial system, and why a totally new kind of restructured banking system is required before the financial system can stabilize and the real economy halt its accelerating decline.Public-Private Investment Fund (PPIF)The PPIF is the ‘Son of TARP’. It is the inheritor of the failed TARP program launched in September 2008. Then Secretary of the Treasury, Paulson, panicked the U.S. Congress into granting him a check worth $700 billion in order to buy the ‘bad assets’ on the balance sheets of banks. Cleaning up the bad assets was necessary, he argued, in order to get the banks to begin lending again—both to homeowners and the mortgage markets and to general business.Paulson was given the money and then did nothing about buying bad assets. He instead threw $125 billion at the 9 biggest banks, followed by another roughly $125 billion to scores of regional and smaller banks. None of it purchased bad assets. Another $80 billion or so went to AIG in several installments. Tens of billions more to Citigroup. Nearly $20 billion to auto companies. Further billions were dissipated here and there, so that by February 2009 less than $190 billion of the $700 remained. None of it expended to purchase ‘bad assets’.The reason why it was never used to sop up the bad assets on bank balance sheets are the same reason why Paulson’s successor at the Treasury under Obama, Tim Geithner, will also fail in cleaning up the bad assets with the PPIF, son of TARP. Because the banks wont sell them at anything resembling market prices and the true value of the ‘bad assets’ on their books.Paulson faced the dilemma of selling the assets at their market price, which was virtually worthless. Since the banks were keeping the assets on their books at inflated, above market price, they had no incentive to sell them at market prices and register even greater losses in doing so. They wanted Paulson to buy them at above market price. If he did, however, he would be charged with providing a windfall profit to the banks purchasing the assets well above what they were worth. So he did nothing. Or next to nothing. He used them to purchase preferred stock in the banks, in the hope that it would at least partially close up the ‘black hole’ on bank balance sheets that was ever-widening as the value of housing prices, mortgage bonds, and other securities continued to collapse in value as housing prices continued to fall. The fall in housing prices was in turn due to the flood of supply of houses coming onto the market as a result of foreclosures.In other words, pumping money into the banks via TARP only served to temporarily plug in part an ever-growing hole driven by housing value collapse which the TARP did not in any way address. TARP addressed the symptom of collapsing balance sheets and not the cause of those collapsing balance sheets. In fact, all the measures of the Treasury and Federal Reserve since the crisis began in 2007 share the common strategic error of throwing liquidity (read: taxpayer money) at the balance sheet hole while ignoring solutions to stop the cause of the hole’s constant expansion. To put it all another way, it was politically more correct for government friends of bankers to help repeatedly, time and again, shore up bank balance sheets, even if temporarily, instead of helping homeowners avoid foreclosure in the millions. Unfortunately, the latter was and remains the solution, while the former a failed treatment of the symptom.The PPIF and Geithner face the same dilemma. Namely, how to get the banks that are now ‘on strike’ and refusing to lend because they don’t have the assets and reserves to lend, to begin doing so. Geithner’s plan is TARP with a twist. The idea is to subsidize the price of the bad assets at government expense, and by doing so provide an incentive to both the banks to sell and investors to buy the bad assets at well above their true value, low, market price.PPIF Becomes PPIP After Bankers-Investors ResistIn his original version of Geithner’s PPIF announced in February, the program was designed to provide a subsidy to banks (sellers) and investors (buyers) as follows: The Treasury would put in what remains of TARP ($100 billion) plus additional money up to $1 trillion, which would likely expand eventually well beyond $1 trillion. The trillion was to be used to pay the banks the difference between the true low market price and whatever the new price might be. In addition, the government would pay the investors another amount at taxpayer expense to incent them in turn to purchase at a price that is above the low market true value of the assets. An auction like event would be held. In short, whatever the seller (banks) and buyer (investors) end up with as a price, the Government will subsidize the difference for both. That would, theoretically, establish a new market price at which subsequent assets might be sold. Thus the dilemma faced by Paulson—no market price acceptable to investor-buyers or bank-sellers—would be resolved.This first Geithner plan was attacked vigorously by bankers, investors, and the general business press; the stock market plunged accordingly. Geithner thereafter went back to the drawing table for several weeks to revise the plan.As he was rewriting his original proposals several important events occurred: first, a firestorm over bank bonuses emerged in the interim, provoked by the leaking of information that AIG, the insurance giant, more than 80% owned by the government as a result of a series of direct bailouts since last October amounting to more than $170 billion, had recently paid bonuses of billions to its same traders that brought the company down in the first place.A second major interim development was the Congressional Budget Office announced in March that the US budget deficits would range from $1.2 to $1.8 trillion this coming year. This arose at a time during which Obama also was faced with increasing resistance in Congress to the passage of his general budget, which promised to add still hundreds of billions of dollars more to the deficit.All this meant growing awareness about the costs of more bank bailouts to the Treasury and annual budget deficit. Growing pressures on the deficit meant that financing PPIP directly from the Treasury would add trillions more immediately to the deficit. Another way, bypassing the Treasury with ‘smoke and mirrors’, had to be found.Complicating the ‘interim’ situation even further, banker-investor resistance was rising to the increasing likelihood that Congress was about to levy higher taxes on banker-investor bonuses and compensation. Their response to the Obama administration was to threaten not to participate in the PPIP if their income and capital gains taxes were ‘rolled back’ to 1980 levels of 70% tax rates, as Congress was threatening.Geithner then released on March 23 his ‘revised’ formula for government subsidizing of bankers and investors to get them to buy and sell ‘bad assets’. This new formula did not rely on direct price subsidization, as under the initial Geithner plan, but instead provided virtually unlimited government funds at near zero cost to investors-speculators (e.g. the hedge funds, private equity firms, mutual funds, wealthy investors, etc.) with which to buy the ‘bad assets’. The ‘bad assets’ come in two basic forms: bad bank loans and bad toxic securities (the latter based on subprime mortgages, asset backed commercial paper based CDOs, securitized auto, credit card, and student loans, etc.)The free loans available to buy both forms of ‘bad assets’ were also now provided as ‘non-recourse’ according to the new Geithner plan. That meant if the bad assets purchased fell in value after purchase, the borrower (investor-speculators) did not have to pay them back. Furthermore, the borrower did not have to put up any collateral of his own for the government ‘free money’ loan.This was an even better arrangement (read: more profitable) for capitalist investors (hedge funds, private equity, etc.). Under the initial arrangement announced by Geither in February, despite the government paying for part of the purchase price for the bad assets, the borrower (speculator-investors) still had to put up their money to pay for a good part of the total price of the purchase. Now they had to put up much less, at most one-sixth, and could borrow the rest from the government at no cost and no risk whatsoever.The revised Geithner plan was also a better arrangement for the Treasury. A new method of financing meant there would not be as great a ‘hit’ on the budget directly. As noted above, resistance to greater budget deficits was rising rapidly in Congress and thus also to additional funding for any kind of increase in TARP or Treasury direct funding of bailouts . A new approach had to be worked out. That new arrangement, contained in Geithner’s revised PPIP, meant subsidies for financing ‘bad loans’ assets to borrowers(investors) and sellers (bankers) will not come directly from the Treasury, but from the FDIC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company. Likewise, subsidies for financing the ‘bad securities’ assets will come directly from the Federal Reserve.The second, revised Geithner plan for PPIP thus represents a major strategic shift by the Obama team with regard to bank bailouts. It is a shift toward having the bulk, perhaps eventually all, the bank bailout funding coming from the Federal Reserve and not the Treasury-Congress. That means having the Fed finance the future lion’s share of bank bailouts by monetizing the debt—that is, by printing new Federal Reserve Bonds.It appears in Geithner’s March 23 revised announcement, only the $100 billion left of TARP I funds held by the Treasury will be used to start the PPIP subsidies. Talk is that the FDIC may get another $500 billion from the Treasury or even Congress directly to add to the initial financing. (If so, that will add to the US budget deficit). However, it is more likely that the FDIC will get its funding from the Fed and monetization (or what the Fed calls ‘quantitative easing’) than directly from Congress, although some may come from Congress initially as well. Statements by the Treasury-Fed on March 23 make it clear, however, that the Federal Reserve will be the major future conduit for FDIC loans to finance and subsidize bank ‘bad loans’ sales.The same applies for the Fed when it runs out of Treasuries to sell. Its future source will be the issuance of its own ‘Fed Bonds’, a new development that will soon begin. Issuing its own bonds amounts to ‘quantitative easing’, as it is euphemistically called. Which is a term that essentially means ‘monetizing’ or printing the money.What all this means is that the Treasury is running out of bonds. If it has to go back to Congress for more authority to issue more bonds that will add dramatically to the budget deficit further. The Treasury is becoming increasingly concerned whether it can get Congressional approval in order to fund further bank bailouts directly. Obama and team have decided therefore, as Plan B, to use the Fed (which doesn’t need Congress approval to issue bonds in its own name) to finance the continued multi-trillion bank bailouts. It all amounts to a major strategic shift.It also means growing pressure on the dollar as the key international currency down the road, as the US government and the Federal Reserve start to print massive amounts of money in the form of new Fed bonds to pay for the bailout. Should it occur it marks the beginning of the end for the dominance of the dollar in global markets. It represents in the meantime a decision to bail out the banks in the short term, at the potential expense of the US dollar as a world currency in the longer term.It was no coincidence that, within hours of the Geithner revised plan, the Chinese asked for assurances from the US government for the value of the nearly $2 trillion in U.S. government assets China holds at present. And it largely explains why China thereafter followed up with a statement that the capitalist economies should reconsider shifting from dollars to IMF created, so-called ‘SDRs’ (special drawing rights) as the new currency of the future.Only $2.5 to $5.0 Trillion More to GoThe key question is how much money may the Federal Reserve eventually have to ‘print’ to bail out the banks? But how much ‘bad assets’ are out there that must be sold in order to ‘clean up’ bank balance sheets? The estimates range from $3.6 trillion, according to New York University professor, Nouriel Roubini, who has been accurately predicting the crisis for more than a year now, to $4 trillion by Fortune magazine, to $6 trillion by Treasury Secretary Geithner in a talk he gave in June 2008 before becoming Secretary. So hang on. There’s at least $2.5 to $5 trillion more that taxpayers may have to fork over to the PPIF (now PPIP) before it’s over.The fundamentally flawed premise of the PPIP is that enough investors will enter the market if subsidized to buy that huge amount of bad assets. Or that the banks will agree to sell at the auction determined price. Or that the US government will be able to throw in $2.5 to $5 trillion more.Another problem is that the root cause of the bad asset price decline will still continue despite PPIP—i.e. the collapsing housing and other asset prices. The $2.5 to $5 trillion is what the bad assets are ‘worth’ at the moment. Those values can potentially fall further, as in fact they have for the past eighteen months. Housing prices have fallen by 25% to date. Our prediction is that they will fall at least another 20%. Foreclosures are rising, as are delinquencies and defaults. Moreover, they are spreading from subprime to ‘Alt-A’ to prime mortgage loans and bleeding into the commercial property mortgage markets as well. Homeowners with negative equity will also walk away from properties, throwing more supply on the market and further depressing prices. Then there’s the millions more now experiencing unprecedented job loss. They too will add appreciably to the delinquency, default, foreclosure downward pressures on home prices. In short,bank assets will continue to erode in value. Bad asset totals will rise. Government subsidy costs to banks and investors will consequently have to rise in turn. The fundamental problem is thus still not addressed, let alone resolved.PPIF-PPIP, son of TARP, is therefore as doomed as its predecessor, TARP I, so long as housing supply continues to rise and housing asset prices continue to fall.This scenario is not unique or unprecedented. The same happened in the 1930s. Housing prices did not stop falling for more than five years into the Depression, until the Roosevelt administration created the Reconstruction Finance Corp (RFC) and revitalized the Home Owners Loan Corp (HOLC) and went into the mortgage market directly. The RFC arbitrarily determined a price and enforced it. It dissolved bad banks and wrote off their worthless assets. It forced merged those banks that could be saved. The HOLC then directly renegotiated with homeowners, resetting their interest and principal. That finally stabilized the housing market. It quickly produced an equity/stock market resurgence in 1935-36.TALF as PLAN ‘B’Another problem with PPIF, even in its revised PPIP form, is what is ‘Plan B’? What is the back up, the alternative if does not succeed in cleaning up the bad assets from bank balance sheets? How much longer and further will Congress and the public support throwing more money down the ever-widening black hole of bank balance sheets? Enter TALF as Plan B.TALF is another $1 trillion plan for financial bailouts at taxpayer expense. The idea originated at the Federal Reserve in the closing months of 2008 but was put on hold. Originally funded at $200 billion, Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, held the program back until the Obama administration assumed office.Unlike the original PPIF, TALF is envisioned as a plan to resurrect the shadow banking system, and the securitized asset markets in particular that collapsed after 2007. Approximately one half of total lending in 2007 ($5.65 trillion) occurred in the securitized markets. This declined to $160 billion in 2008 and to a mere several $billions by early 2009.The ‘shadow banking’ system is a network of non-bank financial institutions, most notable of which are the hedge funds, private equity funds, and the like. It was excessive leveraging via securitization that was responsible for much of the speculation driving the subprime and other asset markets until they busted in the summer of 2007. It is thus ironic that the Fed and Treasury now pursue via TALF the resurrection of those same markets and that same shadow banking system.The idea of TALF is to loan $1 trillion or more to the shadow banking system to have its various institutions (Hedge funds and Private Equity in particular) buy up securitized assets that bundle auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, and even commercial property loans. These latter ‘consumer credit’ markets are about to collapse and in doing so provide a ‘subprime-like’ magnitude of losses for financial institutions, including banks. Credit card companies, for example, estimate that defaults on payments will rise from around 4% in early 2009 to 8%-10% or more. TALF is designed to prevent the collapse of these securitized asset backed consumer credit markets.But TALF represents something even more significant. It represents the lack of confidence on the part of the Obama administration that the regular banking system can lead a lending recovery and thus the restoration of financial market stability. TALF means the administration and the Fed will not wait for the banks to lead the way. The logic of TALF, moreover, is that if the shadow banking system does not rise to the incentive and finance the consumer credit markets, then the Federal Reserve will have to do so itself directly. Should such happen, the Fed will not only evolve from lender of last resort and lender of first resort (since 2007), to lender of primary resort—at least in the consumer credit markets. There is no other alternative. The consumer credit markets cannot be allowed to collapse. To do so would precipitate a bona fide depression given the current state of weakness of the economy and financial system. But if the shadow banking systemfails to sufficiently participate, then the Fed must.This raises the further question whether the hedge and private equity funds can do so. Hedge funds in particular have lost half their value in the past eighteen months due to losses and withdrawals. Once a $2 trillion industry it is now barely $1 trillion. Similar declines have characterized the state of the private equity funds. Furthermore, it is hard to see how the securitized asset markets can be revived, given their ‘toxic’ reputation and the virtual total collapse of these markets.Should the Fed have to go it alone that would represent a major shift in the direction of a totally new kind of banking structure. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that TALF and the Fed would serve as a ‘holding action’ to buy time for the implementation of a ‘Swedish Model’ of bank nationalization, such as occurred in that country in the early 1990s when the government took over the banks directly, cleaned up their bad assets, and then spun them off to private interests again in a kind of capitalist form of nationalization.HASP—Obama’s Housing Recovery ProposalObama’s housing plan has two parts. The first is another $200 billion funding set aside for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This is just a continuation of prior arrangements under the Bush-Paulson period. The two companies were partially nationalized in August 2008 and provided with $200-$300 billion with which to directly buy home mortgages. By February 2009 they had run out of those funds, and now another $200 billion is allocated as part of the Obama plan. The problem with Fannie/Freddie, however, is that they own only roughly 26% of the $12 trillion residential mortgage market. The major problem with subprime mortgages and foreclosures is occurring totally outside Fannie/Freddie’s reach—in the securitized residential mortgage market segment.Another major problem with this first part of the Obama Housing Plan is that any homeowner that is delinquent, in default, or in foreclosure proceedings is not eligible. Those who need it the most are thus excluded. And if the market value of your home has fallen more than 5% below the mortgage owed, forget it. You don’t qualify. In other words, Part 1 is a subsidy to the industry, a gimmick to help lenders refinance safe mortgages and thus generate refinancing income for lenders; it is not a program to help homeowners in distress or to stop housing supply continuing to flood the market and depress housing prices.As of late February, data show that the US home price index has fallen 27% from its peak in 2006, for the thirtieth consecutive month. The last three months show an accelerating rate of decline. Should prices continue to fall at the rate registered between last November and January 2009, it will mean another 33% fall in median home prices this coming year, according to data from the National Association of Realtors.A second part of the Obama housing program is to provide a further $75 billion. These funds are committed to subsidizing mortgage lenders to lower their interest rates on new mortgages to 4-4.5% on average from current higher market rates at around 5.5%. Under Plan 2 loan principal may also be lowered to 31% of the homeowners’ gross income, but only as a very last resort and for a temporary period of up to five years. And the government will pay (i.e. subsidize) the lenders the difference between the 31% and 38%, or 7% of the loan for that period. Part 2 (unlike Part 1) may apply to homeowners who are delinquent. But it is still largely a voluntary program dependent on the agreement of lenders. And if they are unwilling to modify rates and principals when requested by the homeowner, too bad for the homeowner. While progressive Democrats in Congress are attempting to give bankruptcy judges the power to force lenders to modify loans if they refuseafter requested, that legislation has been vigorously resisted and blocked so far by industry groups like the American Bankers Association.And who are the financial institutions that will benefit most from Plan 2? The banks. Two thirds of all the home loans in the U.S. are serviced by Citi, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo. Once again, in other words, what we have here is a subsidy to the same institutions set to benefit from the PPIF. It is another version of ‘trickle down’, in which government-taxpayer money is given to companies to entice them to lower rates which they should be doing on their own in the first place if they want to remain independent.Like prior Bush initiatives, the approach here is to try to stimulate housing demand and in that way to slow the collapse of housing prices. But the supply of houses coming on to the market is massive, and is swamping any tepid attempts to put a floor under housing prices via a demand side approach. Housing supply has been and will continue to overwhelm housing demand, with the consequent decline of housing prices continuing.Thus far no credible approach has been offered to check housing supply and stem housing price declines. In the end housing price decline can only be contained by a nationalization of the residential mortgage markets and a fundamental reset of both interest and principle for homeowners in stress—i.e. much as it was done in the 1930s.Summary and PredictionsThe fiscal stimulus side of the Obama program is clearly a case of ‘too little too late’. It fails to address the central need of massive job creation. It lacks in both magnitude and composition of its focus. A second stimulus package within a year is inevitable.The Bank and Finance stability measures of the Obama program are no more likely to succeed. They do not focus on housing asset price collapse directly , but only indirectly via trickle down and subsidization of the mortgage lenders.Both the original PPIF and the revised PPIP attempt desperately to create a market for bad assets by means of subsidizing both banks and investors at taxpayer expense. The program will require far more than the initially estimated $1 trillion. To the extent the financing comes from the Treasury or Congress, it will mean further taxpayer cost. But should the financing come via the Fed and monetization, the cost will not reflect in the immediate Obama budget but most likely in runaway inflation down the road.The point is that other less costly approaches exist. To pursue the PPIF-PPIP means to virtually prevent any real stimulus spending package. The bank rescue in its current forms are thus ‘crowding out’ any chance of real fiscal led recovery. They are draining the financial lifeblood of the taxpayer and the US government itself.The TALF represents a wild gamble that a revived shadow banking system, and a resurrection of the securitized asset markets will somehow be able to prevent the collapse of the consumer credit (auto, student loan, credit cards) and the commercial property market which will have to refinance more than $170 billion in 2009. However, this is highly unlikely to happen, given the declining condition of hedge funds, private equity, and the rest of the shadow banking community.The consequence of the all this excess bank rescue spending is a cost to the US taxpayer in the long run of at minimum $4 to $5 trillion. How much directly in the short run via the US budget vs. how much in the long run via ‘monetization’ through the Fed is unclear at the moment. However, a recent study by University of California economists, Auerbach and Gale, projects annual deficits of $1 trillion or more for each of the next ten years. It is highly doubtful the US economy can sustain that kind of deficit spending for that period of time, without seriously threatening the US Treasury markets and causing an eventual collapse of the US dollar in world markets.The US and world economy are on the knife-edge of a transition from an Epic Recession to a bona fide Depression. Will there be a depression? The failure of the Obama programs in 2009 to stabilize the economy in this junctural year will raise the possibility of Depression in 2010 to at least a 50-50 possibility. Monetization, ‘quantitative easing’, by the Fed raises the additional spectre of severe dollar currency instability, global trade instability, and another financial crisis of potentially event greater dimensions down the road.Any number of several severe events could precipitate a descent into depression. A series of sovereign debt crises in Europe are a real possibility. A likely scenario is the collapse of one or more east European countries that might pull down, for example, Austrian and then Italian banks and spread thereafter to other banking institutions. Another scenario might be the continued escalation of jobless beyond 20 million in the U.S., TALF failure to rescue consumer credit markets, a collapse of the Treasuries markets as Fed ‘monetization’ continues unabated, and the like. Another precipitating scenario might be the global collapse of bond markets, in particular investment grade bonds, or a severe crisis in the Credit Default Swaps market globally as well. There are of course other potentially serious scenarios that might serve as precipitating events.Whatever the possible event, one thing is not conjectural at this point. It is that the Obama administration rescue program, as formulated in February 2009, is seriously deficient as a plan to stem the accelerating decline in joblessness and GDP, on the one hand, and as a plan to stabilize the financial system on the other. The failure of the plan in 2009 raises the very real possibility of a further worsening of the current Epic Recession underway in the US and increasingly globally as well. While the economy is not yet in the anteroom of a bona fide depression, it is nonetheless at the front door, which has now been opened.A new, alternative plan will have to be proposed and implemented before the end of 2009. The ‘bank nationalization’ debate will re-emerge high on the political agenda once again before year end. The Obama administration will have to get much bolder and aggressive, as the enemies on the right, in corporate boardrooms, among evangelical interests are themselves now gathering their forces. It will be interesting to see whether the Obama team can make the transition from a vision that is much like a Clinton approach in 1993 to one that is more like 1933. However, recent Obama overtures to conciliate and soften its position with the heads of the big banks, hedge funds and the like do not appear as if a more aggressive approach will be undertaken.March 26, 2009 (revisions of original 2-28-09 article)Jack Rasmus’s forthcoming book is ‘EPIC RECESSION AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS’. His works, articles, speeches and interviews are available on his website, HYPERLINK "http://www.kyklosproductions.com" www.kyklosproductions.com.Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre for Research on Globalization. The contents of this article are of sole responsibility of the author(s). The Centre for Research on Globalization will not be responsible or liable for any inaccurate or incorrect statements contained in this article.To become a Member of Global ResearchThe CRG grants permission to cross-post original Global Research articles on community internet sites as long as the text & title are not modified. The source and the author's copyright must be displayed. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: crgeditor@yahoo.comwww.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.For media inquiries: crgeditor@yahoo.com© Copyright Jack Rasmus, Z Magazine, April 2009, 2009The url address of this article is: www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=12819
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A shadow lurks in the housing market

This is scary. The San Francisco Chronicle reports that lenders are sitting on hundreds of thousands of foreclosed homes that haven’t even been listed yet. If this “shadow inventory” hits the market, we’ll have a new definition of bottomless pit.From the article:“We believe there are in the neighborhood of 600,000 properties nationwide that banks have repossessed but not put on the market,” said Rick Sharga, vice president of RealtyTrac, which compiles nationwide statistics on foreclosures. “California probably represents 80,000 of those homes. It could be disastrous if the banks suddenly flooded the market with those distressed properties. You’d have further depreciation and carnage.”The Chronicle suggests several reasons why banks might not be selling off their foreclosures:— The “pig in the python”: Digesting all those foreclosures takes awhile. It’s time-consuming to get a home vacant, clean and ready for sale. “The system is overwhelmed by the volume,” Sharga said. “In a normal market, there are 160,000 (foreclosures for sale nationwide) over the course of a year. Right now, there are about 80,000 every month.”— Accounting sleight-of-hand: Lenders could be deferring sales to put off having to acknowledge the actual extent of their loss. “With banks in the stress they’re in, I don’t think they’re anxious to show losses in assets on their balance sheets,” O’Toole said.— Slowing the free-fall: Banks might be strategically holding back some foreclosures so prices don’t fall as fast. “They want to be careful about not releasing them too quickly so they don’t drive prices down and hurt the values,” O’Toole said.And then, there are people scamming the system. Two dozen people have been indicted for “allegedly conducting a wide-ranging mortgage fraud based in San Diego and led by a street gang member.” From Reuters:The defendants allegedly used straw buyers and inflated appraisals to purchase homes that had sat on the market for extended periods and had been reduced in price.They submitted offers that exceeded the homes’ asking prices, and had the overage paid to a shell construction company that they claimed would make upgrades or handicap modifications to the properties, prosecutors said.The defendants instead disbursed the “kickback amount” to members and associates of the enterprise as payments for their participation, the indictment said.Lenders later foreclosed on the properties, taking “severe financial losses,” after the straw buyers failed to make payments, the indictment said.Jason Donn - Real Estate Open Networkers
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Ok, maybe I am old fashioned maybe, I am a bit of a dunce maybe, I don’t know my A$$ from a hole in the ground….or, maybe, just maybe….I know what I am talking about. So, I got this listing, it’s a short sale…my fav and, I put on the MLS sheet… “Pre-Approval REQUIRED WITH, NO STIPULATIONS, NO EXCEPTIONS” So, I get 15 offers on this house in less than 2 weeks and out of all those 15 offers, not a single one sent me a pre-approval letter as requested. Some pre approval letters were 1 page long, some were 2 pages long. Some had pretty scripted letter head and some had large bold printing. Some were from local mortgage brokers and some were from out of state but, they all had one thing in common. They all said “PRE-APPROVED” yet, they all also had stipulations! Some said things like, “Pre-Approved at time of application” or “Pre-Approved with the following stipulations” and my favorite, “Pre-Approved however not verified” I have to ask, what is a pre-approval? Do our words mean anything now a days or is it just that everyone is pre-approved. I even had one lender tell me that, the buyer is pre-approved but the house isn’t……WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? Is the buyer credit worthy and can buy whatever home he wants or is he teetering on the edge of credit worthiness and the bank requires some sort of inspection or appraisal…..WHAT DOES IT MEAN? So, I need to convey the following message in my MLS forms in one line or less….how do you suggest I state it? Just curious?
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I have been listing REOs for about a year and a half....what I have discovered is growing my REO business has proven to be more of a challenge than I could have imagined... I work for approximately four companies, listing their properties....as I started to branch out, looking to apply to work with other companies..of course I was told that I needed "references" Sounds easy right??I have a good releationship with my Asset Managers.....since I am a small fry (don't work for a large franchise brokerage) , in the grand scheme of the REO world...I have to work that much harder to make a name for myself.....I have contacted the companies I work for and 3 of them are "not allowed" to give references......WHAT!!! One of my Asset Mangers, who I have gotten to know.......is very upset about the policy..but it is what it is......What's a Girl to do....? Growing my business, is going to pretty much be just like starting all over......my anology, is I am 4 ft. tall in a room of 6 ft. tall people...having to jump up...to get noticed...much like Horshack on "Welcome back Cotter" :) :)Anyone else run into this problem....:)Konnie McKee, RDCpro703 407 7088 (cell)www.KonnieMac.comREO, Short Sale Specialistwww.KonnieMacSellsREOs.com

Realty Direct14505 Holshire WayHaymarket, Virginia 20169703 407 708
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This is by far the best news piece I have seen on the credit crisis created by housing and the road to recovery. It does not take "Party" sides. It features Willam Black an Econ and Law Professor who worked as a regulator during the Saving and Loan Scandel in the 1990s.http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04032009/watch.htmlI have a feeling this brings a new tone to our financial situation and gives some make sence ideas.
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Designations - Plus or A Waste of Time!

I would like to know from a AM's perspective, what designations do you prefer and do you specifically look them out when you are searching for agents within your property areas? Or is just plain old years of hard work better than any designation you can add to your name?
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